Though Aristotle Supported Slavery, His Philosophy Would Abolish It

The hands of the marble statue “The Greek Slave,” carved in 1844 by Hiram Powers. Photograph by Zack Lee. Some rights reserved.

Aristotle allows for slavery in his classic account of virtue. Some philosophers criticize Aristotle’s ethics as inconsistent for this reason. However, Michael J. Sandel, the Anne T. and Robert M. Bass Professor of Government at Harvard University, argues that Aristotle’s criteria are strong enough to reject slavery on their own grounds. Sandel is correct: if applied rigorously, slavery would not persist under Aristotle’s specifications.

Aristotle’s position on slavery hinges on two requirements: necessity and suitability to nature. Slavery is necessary in that society needs a division of labor to function. It is suitable to some peoples’ natures in that they are “capable of becoming…the property of another, and if he participates in reason to the extent of apprehending it in another, though destitute of it himself (1).”

The function of society does demand a division of labor, but it can be accomplished without the institution of slavery. Many countries operate without slaves today under democratic regimes. Men share child-rearing responsibilities with their spouses. Labor-saving technologies have reduced the time it takes to perform many household activities. Low-wage jobs offer compensation for even the bottom tiers of workers (though other inequalities persist in this system).

Aristotle could not have known of the societal institutions and technologies that have eroded slavery. They had not yet been developed in his time. Examples of advanced slave-less cultures were hard to find. As Sandel notes, “It’s worth recalling that these injustices persisted for more than two thousand years after Aristotle wrote (2).”

Aristotle’s second requirement is teleological; it posits that at least some people are naturally suited to slavery. But it also acknowledges that not all enslaved people are suited for that kind of a life. “Not all those who are actually slaves, or actually freemen, are natural slaves or natural freemen,” he writes (3).

To sort the natural from the unnatural slaves, Aristotle proposes a practical test. Sandel describes this as seeing “who chafes in the role or tries to flee (4).”

Few groups throughout history have actually offered slaves the ability to choose their position. Part of the perceived “suitability” to slavery was instilled via a systematic oppression by the ruling classes that went beyond mere physical abuse. In post-Civil War America, “freed” slaves faced a lack of education, a lack of money, and a forced segregation that blocked access to opportunities – what sociologist W.E.B. Du Bois called “the problem of the color line” in 1903 (5).

Du Bois found many freed slaves to be more destitute in their new condition. He also pointed out, however, that a small proportion of African Americans were already excelling. He expected the number of blacks who succeeded to rise as American institutions and attitudes continued to reform (6).

Today, enough former slaves have demonstrated abilities to reason and participate in the polis to convincingly suggest that no human is naturally suited to slavery. If any twenty-first century American was placed in slavery, he or she would no doubt “chafe in the role.” Coercion, which Aristotle says is a sign of injustice, would have to be applied to create a new slave class. It would fail the test of justice under his own rubric.

Sandel points out that teleological reasoning like Aristotle’s might in fact lead to a more powerful indictment of slavery than that of the modern liberal ethic in that it would also claim some freely chosen jobs to be unjust, because they are “so dangerous, repetitive, and deadening as to be unfit for human beings (7).”

Sandel’s example shows why teleology, at least when applied to certain aspects of human life, remains a powerful tool for moral philosophy. Its emphasis on purposes are open to being revised based upon the introduction of new empirical evidence, which can shape our understanding of what the inherent natures are of peoples and institutions.

Aristotle’s philosophical shortcomings are less the result of Aristotelian inconsistency and more the result of limits to the perspectives available in ancient Greece. Only now that societies have tried living without slavery is the evidence available that it is neither necessary nor natural.

References:

1. Aristotle. The Politics. Translated by David Ross. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1925) Book I, chap. v, 1254b
2. Sandel, Michael J. Justice: What’s the Right Thing To Do? (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009) 200
3. Aristotle. The Politics. Translated by David Ross. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1925) Book I, chap. vi, 1255b
4. Sandel, Michael J. Justice: What’s the Right Thing To Do? (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009) 202
5. Du Bois, William Edward Burghardt. The Souls of Black Folk. (Chicago: A.C. McClurg & Co.; [Cambridge]: University Press John Wilson and Son, Cambridge, U.S.A., 1903) XXXI
6. Du Bois, William Edward Burghardt. The Souls of Black Folk. (Chicago: A.C. McClurg & Co.; [Cambridge]: University Press John Wilson and Son, Cambridge, U.S.A., 1903) 101-102
7. Sandel, Michael J. Justice: What’s the Right Thing To Do? (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009) 203