The Strands of Zen in Western Culture

Photograph by Brandon T. Bisceglia.

The Japanese adaptation of Buddhism known as Zen can seem out of place in Western societies. Those who subscribe to cultural moral relativism believe that unique historical circumstances shape moral values in different cultures, and therefore there are no universally-shared values. They would suggest that the difficulty Westerners have in understanding Zen – particularly its avoidance of reason as a means of working out ethical issues - is evidence of that gulf in universal values.

To say that Zen eschews reason, however, is an oversimplification of the practice. If examined in its nuances, Zen does defy cultural relativism by appealing to numerous values that have appeared in cultures all over the world. Its elusiveness is not unique to peoples of the West – it is counterintuitive by nature.

Reason looms large in the traditions of Western philosophy. Plato and Aristotle both placed a man’s reasoning abilities in a position above other aspects of his character (1, 2). Zen appears to evade reason - to actively sabotage it.

Yet these philosophical expressions all have commonalities that become visible at a more granular level. Plato sees reason as a moderating force that promotes the best possible functioning of the other faculties; a man “will always desire so to attemper the body as to preserve the harmony of the soul (3).” The ultimate aim, to Plato (and Aristotle) is ultimately to live as fruitful a life as can be attained.

Zen’s goal, if it can be said to have one, is similar. T.D. Suzuki says that Zen moves one step beyond reason to break free of the mental constraints of abstract concepts and concentrate on “life as it is lived (4).” Zen does not deny reason a role in life. Suzuki says that practitioners have their own doctrines, but that these do not come directly from Zen, because Zen has no “sacred books or dogmatic tenets (5).”

Zen’s insistence on constantly breaking free from conceptual constructs has similarities to philosophical strains of doubt that have appeared throughout the millennia. In ancient Greece, Pyrrho of Elis first developed a form of systematic doubt that came to be known as skepticism. Pyrrho discovered that he could find vulnerabilities in every philosophical argument. According to Historian Jennifer Michael Hecht, he thought that “since we can know nothing for certain, we must behave as such…We thus stand aloof from life and thereby achieve peace of mind (6).”

Later skepticism integrated its processes into academic philosophy by introducing an important check on the assurance of any conclusion. Carneades of Cyrene made provisional belief acceptable by suggesting that, although nothing could be known, careful scrutiny could show that one conclusion was more likely than another (7).

Carneades’ caveat made it possible for academia and science to maintain their long-term intellectual flexibility. The provisional approach to knowledge admits that, far from being absolute, reason has limitations. It is a deeper concession that there are always more things we do not know than things we do know. It is also profoundly Zen, with echoes in the writings of Suzuki and others.

Other movements in Western cultures continuously strived to break free from old patterns of thinking. Freethinking, transcendentalism, and some elements of postmodernism all contain threads of doubt that, to varying degrees, challenge conceptual paradigms.

Hecht says that American’s introduction to Zen also had an impact on the development of psychotherapy as some eminent professionals, such as Mark Epstein, imported the practice of meditation (8).

Western ideas have also resonated with Eastern thinkers. The Zen story “Not Far From Buddhahood” specifically tells of a student reading a passage from the Biblical Book of Matthew to Gasan. Gasan’s response to the passage is, "That is excellent. Whoever said that is not far from Buddhahood (9)."

It is nevertheless the case that Zen is difficult to understand. Yet Suzuki points out that this is not a problem that only Westerners encounter. Zen is, by nature, “extremely elusive as far as its outward aspects are concerned; when you think you have caught a glimpse of it, it is no more there; from afar it looks so approachable, but as soon as you come near it you see it even further away from you than before (10).”

All systems of doubt can be elusive. Hecht says that there is a narrative to doubt that involves communication and integration across cultures throughout history, including in the case of Zen. However, she says, the elusiveness of these traditions has commonly been portrayed in terms of a “mere collection of shadows on the history of belief (11).” Zen’s Western counterparts may be overshadowed by other philosophical systems, but they remain a robust and vital part of those cultures. And Zen itself is engaged in a productive exchange with that milieu.

References:

1. Plato. The Republic. Translated by Sir Henry Desmond Pritchard Lee. (Plain Label Books, 1955) chap. ix
2. Aristotle. The Nicomachean Ethics. Translated by David Ross. (Oxford University Press, 200) Book X, chap. vii, 194
3. Plato. The Republic. Translated by Sir Henry Desmond Pritchard Lee. (Plain Label Books, 1955) chap. ix, 573
4. Suzuki, Daisetz Teitaro. An Introduction to Zen Buddhism. (Grove Press, 1954) Chap. ii, 45
5. Suzuki, Daisetz Teitaro. An Introduction to Zen Buddhism. (Grove Press, 1954) Chap. ii, 38
6. Hecht, Jennifer Michael. Doubt: A History. (New York: HarperCollins, 2003) Chap. i, 41
7. Hecht, Jennifer Michael. Doubt: A History. (New York: HarperCollins, 2003) Chap. i, 43
8. Hecht, Jennifer Michael. Doubt: A History. (New York: HarperCollins, 2003) Chap. x, 473
9. Senzaki. “Not Far From Buddhahood.” 101 Zen Stories. (Kessinger Publishing, 2004) 16
10. Suzuki, Daisetz Teitaro. An Introduction to Zen Buddhism. (Grove Press, 1954) Chap. ii, 43
11. Hecht, Jennifer Michael. Doubt: A History. (New York: HarperCollins, 2003) Introduction, ix