In early 2007, as Barack Obama’s campaign began to take shape, a California paralegal named Joe Anthony was inundated with responsibility. Several years before, Anthony had begun a MySpace fan page with the url of myspace.com/barackobama, and now it was taking on thousands of new friends.
Because of its popularity, the Obama team decided to work with Anthony to provide him with updates and to keep accurate information on the page. For several months, Anthony handled everything on his own for free. It began to cut into his work, his sleep, and his personal life. Finally, he asked to be paid for his service. The Obama team decided it had better just buy the page from him, and asked Anthony to set a price.
Anthony, who had no experience with this sort of thing, asked for about $39,000.00, an amount that is actually much lower (given the amount of friends – and clout – his page had acquired) than many Internet site owners and media consultants typically earn for similar deals. The Obama team, however, decided not to haggle. Instead, they had MySpace take the url away from Anthony on the grounds that it used Obama’s name. MySpace conceded, on the condition that Anthony got to keep his friends list. In the end, both parties wound up losing – but the Obama team no longer had to worry about someone on the outside having any control over the campaign’s image or message.
The Obama-Anthony debacle highlights the ultimate irony of Obama’s web-savvy campaign machine. By bypassing the middlemen and speaking “directly” to the American public, Obama was able to convince voters that he represented them best without worrying about the analytical scrutiny or filtering of the traditional media. As a result, traditional media professionals, who could only play catch-up in their reports and responses, were often relegated to gauging public response after the fact. This feedback loop allowed the Obama team to insulate its message while giving people the impression that they were shaping a political dialogue that was in fact shaping them.
The media were blocked from all but the most basic access to the campaign. Compared with McCain's "straight talk express," Obama might as well have been locked in a tower somewhere. In a July 24, 2008 article for The New Republic titled "End of the Affair," Gabriel Sherman wrote:
Reporters who cover Obama these days grouse that Obama's flacks shroud the campaign in secrecy and provide little to no access. "They're more disciplined than the Bush people," a reporter on the Obama trail gripes. "There was this idea of being transparent, but they're not. They're total tightwads with information."
Obama’s online campaign was the key to his grass-roots following and his unprecedented contribution base. His team’s organizational power was facilitated its focus on the youth culture, who primarily came to know him through the Internet. These novice voters and campaigners were eager to jump on board a campaign that they could participate in, and unquestioningly did whatever was asked of them. During the summer of 2008, college youths on break lined the streets of Manhattan, harassing passersby like lost Jehovah’s Witnesses. McCain (who, it must be remembered, only trailed by a few points in the popular vote), was barely a presence.
Obama’s online fundraising shattered all previous records. In September 2008, about $100 million of the $150 million he raised came from online contributions. It was the success of this method that gave him the edge in his final months, giving him the ability to buy all kinds of television advertising time and establish an extensive network of regional campaign offices.
But there were serious ethical problems with these funding practices that media outlets attempted to bring to the attention of the public, but which never gained traction. The most notable of these was Obama’s reversal on his promise to accept public funding after it became apparent that his online campaign would proffer him a significant advantage. When he did this, he offered essentially no apology or explanation. The media debated the moral ramifications for about a week, but dropped the subject when it failed to impact public perception. In October of 2008, the Washington Post reported that the Obama team was accepting donations through their website that were potentially untraceable (opening the possibility of illegal donations from people who’d exceeded the limit as well as other shady practices), the story did not even register among the public.
These and other scandals abounded – as did unanswered policy questions – but were only sporadically reported. Often, the story was too old by the time the media even got wind of what was going on. Other times, access was simply too restricted for a journalist to adequately vet an idea or suspicion. Even when stories did get out, the public just shrugged them off. Obama would come onto YouTube or change.org, say something vaguely inspiring, and his supporters would forget about what he’d done.
Now that Obama is living in a White House that is about as technologically advanced as a Commodore 64, he’s relying a little more on the media outlets he once forsook. And, as might be expected, they’ve come down on him a lot harder than they did during the campaign. The “honeymoon” period seems like it ended before he’d been there for a week. He’s promised to open his administration more, and to provide a way for outside voices to be heard in a more direct manner once it can be arranged. There’s no telling whether this will allow him to bypass traditional reporters once again.
But one thing is for sure – if he can avoid it, Obama certainly won’t let anyone else get hold of his message.
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