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Hurricane Sandy, shown here a
day before landfall on Oct. 28, 2012, was one of the largest storms ever to hit
the East Coast. Scientists pointed to the damage caused by the hurricane as one
example of the problems climate change could exacerbate. NASA Earth Observatory image by Robert Simmon
with data courtesy of the NASA/NOAA Geostationary Operational Environmental
Satellite Project Science team.
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Science and technology
policies are based on some facts, but facts only account for a small proportion
of the considerations that shape these policies. Reputation, money, politics
and cultural perceptions all play major roles in determining which facts are
pursued by scientists, as well as how those facts, once uncovered, are used by
other groups.
Among scientists, reputations
act as heuristic signals for colleagues. Reputations are built primarily
through publications, awards, funding and other mechanisms that proceed from
outside the laboratory.
Individual scientists may not
always value these heuristic mechanisms as much as others. Percy W. Bridgman,
for instance, ignored an interview request from the Associated Press about the
announcement that he had won the Nobel Prize - so he could continue his
experiments.[1]
But avoiding participation in
the policy sphere is nearly impossible for most scientists. This was true even
a century ago, when scientists and engineers in the electrical sciences,
aeronautical sciences, and agricultural sciences wrestled with the effects of
patents and industrial funding that threatened idealized notions of “pure
science.” World wars I and II ramped up state support, thus giving many of the
scientists what they had thought was independence.[2]
State patronage also comes
with strings, however. David Edgerton points out that even during the heyday of
science’s growth in the U.S. at the end of World War II, the vast majority of
government sponsorship was for applied research with military goals.[3]
Edgerton says that if one
“follows the money,” one quickly discovers that most science for most of
history actually occurred in applied contexts, and almost always outstripped
basic research in terms of funding, even if popular conceptions of science have
not recognized this.[4]
Even where goals remained
purely scientific, government-sponsored science faces political concerns that
shape agendas. This became apparent to members of the meteorological community
as they attempted to build a cooperative global infrastructure for exchanging
weather data in the early twentieth century. The first incarnation of this
effort, the International Meteorological Organization (IMO), was purely
voluntary. To keep up with technological changes and to keep control of the
standard-setting process, the IMO petitioned to become part of the U.N. Its
establishment as an intergovernmental organization allowed it ultimately to
expand its scope to become a truly globalized entity. But it also brought
political and definitional challenges. It was forced, for instance, to create
“observer” statuses for large states like China that were not at the time
members of the U.N., instead of allowing them full inclusion in the
coordination process.[5]
Politics and money can have
profound influences on the arrangement of policies governing the practice of
science. Despite these forces, scientists have been largely successful at
uncovering facts within those research programs that have been funded, even
when those facts have disagreed with the interests of industry or government.
The question remains: how are these facts incorporated into new policies, if at
all?
Global warming is perhaps the
most striking recent example of the failure of facts effectively to inform
political debate and policymaking in the U.S. Since the issue first exploded
into public consciousness in the late 1980’s, industry-backed denial campaigns
have sought to undermine public confidence in the science itself. Front groups for
oil, gas and other fossil fuel companies have employed a small number of contrarian
scientists to attack peer review and prestigious science organizations that
recognize global warming, such as the National Academy of Sciences.[6]
Politicizing the issue has
polarized the public. Gallup surveys showed that 49 percent of self-identified
Republicans in 2001 believed the effects of global warming had already begun.
By 2010, that had dropped to 29 percent. In the same period, the percentage of
Democrats who believed global warming had begun rose from 60 percent to 70
percent.[7]
Public relations campaigns
have also had a direct influence over perceptions of science among
policymakers. Former Texas Republican Representative Tom Delay in 1995 dismissed
the International Panel on Climate Change’s report without having read it,
saying, “But it’s been my experience that . . . the conclusion is usually
written before the study is even done.” Former California Republican Representative
John Doolittle relied on a single think-tank-sponsored scientist, S. Fred
Singer, to justify his denial of the peer-reviewed science supporting climate
change.[8]
Public officials generally
have neither the time nor expertise properly to weigh scientific issues – or on
the credibility of a given institution’s work. They rely a great deal on lobbyists
and think tanks to provide them with a bottom line. They also have cultural and
political biases that influence their actions.
The Smithsonian's National
Air and Space Museum is a prime example of the role that cultural concerns play
when they intersect with scientific facts. Curators at the museum are
constrained in what exhibits they can display by dominant historical
narratives. Roger D. Launius offers 10 exhibits that he believes could be
compelling, but would not be approved because of cultural sensitivities. Some
of the considerations he cites as deal-breakers include images of crashes,
death, and evoking Cold War fears.[9]
Science and technology
policies must use facts in order to be effective. However, no policy can
sustain itself without taking into account influences such as money, politics,
and culture. The difference between the effective and the poor lays not in
whether policies are free of these influences, but in how they are ultimately
reconciled with the facts.
[1] Gerald Holton, “Candor and Integrity in Science,”
Syntheses 145 (2005), 277-294, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20118593, 11-13-13;
[2] Christine MacLeod, “Reluctant Entrepreneurs: Patents
and State Patronage in New Technosciences, circa 1870-1930,” Isis 103 (2012),
328-339, http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/666359, 11-13-13;
[3] David
Edgerton, “Time, Money, and History,” Isis 103 (2012), 316-327,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/666358, 11-13-13;
[4] Ibid.;
[5] Paul
N. Edwards, “Meteorology as Infrastructural Globalism,” Osiris 21 (2006),
229-250, http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/507143, 11-26-13;
[6] Riley
E. Dunlap and Aaron M. McCright, “The Climate Change Denial Campaign,” SSN
Scholars Strategy Network, January 2013,
http://www.scholarsstrategynetwork.org/sites/default/files/ssn_key_findings_dunlap_and_mccright_on_climate_change_denial.pdf,
11-26-13;
[7] Aaron
M. McCright and Riley E. Dunlap, “The Polarization of U.S. Public Opinion on
Climate Change,” Scholars Strategy Network, January 2013, http://www.scholarsstrategynetwork.org/sites/default/files/ssn_key_findings_mccright_and_dunlap_on_political_polarization_on_climate_change.pdf,11-26-13;
[8] Myanna Lahsen, “Technocracy, Democracy, and U.S.
Climate Politics: The need for Demarcations,” Science, Technology, & Human
Values 30 (2005), 137-169,http://www.jstor.org/stable/1558016, 11-26-13;
[9] Roger D. Launius, “American Memory, Culture Wars, and
the Challenge of Presenting Science and Technology in a National Museum,” The
Public Historian, 29, 1 (Winter 2007), 13-30,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/tph.2007.29.1.13, 11-22-13.
