Science Policies Can't Just Rest on Facts

Hurricane Sandy, shown here a day before landfall on Oct. 28, 2012, was one of the largest storms ever to hit the East Coast. Scientists pointed to the damage caused by the hurricane as one example of the problems climate change could exacerbate. NASA Earth Observatory image by Robert Simmon with data courtesy of the NASA/NOAA Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite Project Science team.

Science and technology policies are based on some facts, but facts only account for a small proportion of the considerations that shape these policies. Reputation, money, politics and cultural perceptions all play major roles in determining which facts are pursued by scientists, as well as how those facts, once uncovered, are used by other groups.

Among scientists, reputations act as heuristic signals for colleagues. Reputations are built primarily through publications, awards, funding and other mechanisms that proceed from outside the laboratory.

Individual scientists may not always value these heuristic mechanisms as much as others. Percy W. Bridgman, for instance, ignored an interview request from the Associated Press about the announcement that he had won the Nobel Prize - so he could continue his experiments.[1]

But avoiding participation in the policy sphere is nearly impossible for most scientists. This was true even a century ago, when scientists and engineers in the electrical sciences, aeronautical sciences, and agricultural sciences wrestled with the effects of patents and industrial funding that threatened idealized notions of “pure science.” World wars I and II ramped up state support, thus giving many of the scientists what they had thought was independence.[2]

State patronage also comes with strings, however. David Edgerton points out that even during the heyday of science’s growth in the U.S. at the end of World War II, the vast majority of government sponsorship was for applied research with military goals.[3]

Edgerton says that if one “follows the money,” one quickly discovers that most science for most of history actually occurred in applied contexts, and almost always outstripped basic research in terms of funding, even if popular conceptions of science have not recognized this.[4]

Even where goals remained purely scientific, government-sponsored science faces political concerns that shape agendas. This became apparent to members of the meteorological community as they attempted to build a cooperative global infrastructure for exchanging weather data in the early twentieth century. The first incarnation of this effort, the International Meteorological Organization (IMO), was purely voluntary. To keep up with technological changes and to keep control of the standard-setting process, the IMO petitioned to become part of the U.N. Its establishment as an intergovernmental organization allowed it ultimately to expand its scope to become a truly globalized entity. But it also brought political and definitional challenges. It was forced, for instance, to create “observer” statuses for large states like China that were not at the time members of the U.N., instead of allowing them full inclusion in the coordination process.[5]

Politics and money can have profound influences on the arrangement of policies governing the practice of science. Despite these forces, scientists have been largely successful at uncovering facts within those research programs that have been funded, even when those facts have disagreed with the interests of industry or government. The question remains: how are these facts incorporated into new policies, if at all?

Global warming is perhaps the most striking recent example of the failure of facts effectively to inform political debate and policymaking in the U.S. Since the issue first exploded into public consciousness in the late 1980’s, industry-backed denial campaigns have sought to undermine public confidence in the science itself. Front groups for oil, gas and other fossil fuel companies have employed a small number of contrarian scientists to attack peer review and prestigious science organizations that recognize global warming, such as the National Academy of Sciences.[6]

Politicizing the issue has polarized the public. Gallup surveys showed that 49 percent of self-identified Republicans in 2001 believed the effects of global warming had already begun. By 2010, that had dropped to 29 percent. In the same period, the percentage of Democrats who believed global warming had begun rose from 60 percent to 70 percent.[7]

Public relations campaigns have also had a direct influence over perceptions of science among policymakers. Former Texas Republican Representative Tom Delay in 1995 dismissed the International Panel on Climate Change’s report without having read it, saying, “But it’s been my experience that . . . the conclusion is usually written before the study is even done.” Former California Republican Representative John Doolittle relied on a single think-tank-sponsored scientist, S. Fred Singer, to justify his denial of the peer-reviewed science supporting climate change.[8]

Public officials generally have neither the time nor expertise properly to weigh scientific issues – or on the credibility of a given institution’s work. They rely a great deal on lobbyists and think tanks to provide them with a bottom line. They also have cultural and political biases that influence their actions.

The Smithsonian's National Air and Space Museum is a prime example of the role that cultural concerns play when they intersect with scientific facts. Curators at the museum are constrained in what exhibits they can display by dominant historical narratives. Roger D. Launius offers 10 exhibits that he believes could be compelling, but would not be approved because of cultural sensitivities. Some of the considerations he cites as deal-breakers include images of crashes, death, and evoking Cold War fears.[9]

Science and technology policies must use facts in order to be effective. However, no policy can sustain itself without taking into account influences such as money, politics, and culture. The difference between the effective and the poor lays not in whether policies are free of these influences, but in how they are ultimately reconciled with the facts.

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[1] Gerald Holton, “Candor and Integrity in Science,” Syntheses 145 (2005), 277-294, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20118593, 11-13-13;

[2] Christine MacLeod, “Reluctant Entrepreneurs: Patents and State Patronage in New Technosciences, circa 1870-1930,” Isis 103 (2012), 328-339, http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/666359, 11-13-13;

[3]           David Edgerton, “Time, Money, and History,” Isis 103 (2012), 316-327, http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/666358, 11-13-13;

[4]           Ibid.;

[5]           Paul N. Edwards, “Meteorology as Infrastructural Globalism,” Osiris 21 (2006), 229-250, http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/507143, 11-26-13;

[6]           Riley E. Dunlap and Aaron M. McCright, “The Climate Change Denial Campaign,” SSN Scholars Strategy Network, January 2013, http://www.scholarsstrategynetwork.org/sites/default/files/ssn_key_findings_dunlap_and_mccright_on_climate_change_denial.pdf, 11-26-13;

[7]           Aaron M. McCright and Riley E. Dunlap, “The Polarization of U.S. Public Opinion on Climate Change,” Scholars Strategy Network, January 2013, http://www.scholarsstrategynetwork.org/sites/default/files/ssn_key_findings_mccright_and_dunlap_on_political_polarization_on_climate_change.pdf,11-26-13;

[8] Myanna Lahsen, “Technocracy, Democracy, and U.S. Climate Politics: The need for Demarcations,” Science, Technology, & Human Values 30 (2005), 137-169,http://www.jstor.org/stable/1558016, 11-26-13;

[9] Roger D. Launius, “American Memory, Culture Wars, and the Challenge of Presenting Science and Technology in a National Museum,” The Public Historian, 29, 1 (Winter 2007), 13-30, http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/tph.2007.29.1.13, 11-22-13.